This paper introduces a differentially private (DP) mechanism to protect the information exchanged during the coordination of sequential and interdependent markets. This coordination represents a classic Stackelberg game and relies on the exchange of sensitive information between the system agents. The paper is motivated by the observation that the perturbation introduced by traditional DP mechanisms fundamentally changes the underlying optimization problem and even leads to unsatisfiable instances. To remedy such limitation, the paper introduces the Privacy-Preserving Stackelberg Mechanism (PPSM), a framework that enforces the notions of feasibility and fidelity of the privacypreserving information to the original problem objective. PPSM complies with the notion of differential privacy and ensures that the outcomes of the privacy-preserving coordination mechanism are close-to-optimality for each agent. Experimental results on several gas and electricity market benchmarks based on a real case study demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach.
Introduction
The coordination of sequential and interdependent agents in market-based systems has traditionally been modeled as a Stackelberg game [Simaan and Cruz, 1973] . While the coordination among these agents is central to achieve efficient and cost-effective operations, it also requires the exchange of proprietary information between the agents in order to achieve an optimal strategy. For instance, in the context of electricity and gas markets, relevant data may represent the costs of producers, the loads of consumers, or technical characteristics of the energy network. As has been observed in various works (e.g., [Zugno et al., 2013; Baringo and Conejo, 2013] ), such information may be sensitive: It can provide a competitive advantage over other strategic agents in the system, it may induce financial losses, and it may even benefit external attackers [Maharjan et al., 2013] .
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To address this issue, several privacy-preserving frameworks have been proposed, with Differential Privacy (DP) [Dwork et al., 2006] emerging as a robust privacy framework for many applications. DP allows to measure and bound the risk associated with an individual participation in an analysis task. DP algorithms rely on the injection of carefully calibrated noise to the output of a computation. They can thus be used to obfuscate the sensitive data exchanged by the system agents in the market. However, as shown in Section 7, when perturbed data are used as input to Stackelberg games, they may produce results that are fundamentally different from those obtained on the original data: They often transform the nature of the underlying optimization problem and even lead to severe feasibility issues.
This paper is a first step in addressing this challenge. It introduces the Privacy-Preserving Stackelberg Mechanism (PPSM) for the coordination of sequential and interdependent agents. PPSM is a two-stage protocol that allows the coordinating agents to exchange differentially private data of high fidelity. In particular, PPSM relies on several learning and optimization models (including fidelity constraints on the objectives and coordination variables of the agents) to ensure that the privacy-preserving information exchanged between the agents preserves the feasibility and near-optimality of the original Stackelberg game. PPSM has been analyzed both theoretically and experimentally. The theoretical guarantees ensure differential privacy and near optimality, while the experimental results validate the approach on a real test case for the coordination of electricity and natural gas markets in the Northeastern United States [Byeon and Van Hentenryck, 2019 ]. The case study shows that PPSM can bring up to two orders of magnitude error reduction over standard privacypreserving mechanisms.
Although the paper was motivated by the coordination between natural gas and electricity markets, the proposed methods may apply to any type of coordination mechanism between sequential and interdependent agents where the agents exchange information and synchronize through price signals.
Problem Definition and Privacy Goal
The strategies of two sequential and interdependent agents, such as energy market operators, represent a classic Stackelberg game [Simaan and Cruz, 1973] . In this framework, which is schematically illustrated in Figure 1 , the leader (e.g., 
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where x L represents the vector of decision variables of the leader, and x F and y F the vectors of primal and dual decision variables of the follower. Additionally, D L and (D F P , D F S q are the inputs of the leader and follower problems, respectively. The follower inputs are either public (D F P ) or sensitive (D F S ). The upper-level problem minimizes the leader objective cost (1a), constrained by its feasible decision space F L (1b), and the reaction of the follower in the lowerlevel problem (1c) and (1d). The follower problem, denoted by P F`xL , D F P , D F S˘, minimizes the follower objective cost (1c), constrained by the feasible space F F of the follower decisions (1d). Coordination Variables: The leader primal variables x L appear as fixed parameters in the expression of the follower feasible space F F . In return, the lower-level problem provides feedback from the follower dual variables y F to the upperlevel problem through its feasible space F L . In energy markets, primal variables typically represent commitment and energy production decisions, while dual variables represent energy prices. These variables shared between the follower and the leader are called coordination variables. Assumptions: Due to the sequential decision-making nature, the leader needs to anticipate the reaction of the follower. Therefore, this paper assumes that the leader has access to a prediction model M L pD L , D F P , D F S q that predicts the values y F of the follower dual variables. This is a natural assumption in energy markets applications that motivates this paper: Such forecasting models are used in practice since generators must predict energy prices in order to efficiently bid in the markets and the market needs to ensure reliability of the overall system. Similarly, the follower has access to a forecasting model M F px L , D F P , D F S q that predicts its objective valueŌ F˚a nd the values of its dual variablesȳ F. This is also a natural assumption in energy markets since the energy prices and costs, representing the values of the dual variables and objective cost of the follower problem P F`xL , D F P , D F S˘, are released publicly, and thus can be used to train precise estimators. The PPSM mechanism in this paper applies these forecasting models on privacy-preserving versions of the sensitive parameters. Motivation Problem: Byeon and Van Hentenryck [2019] recently showed that the coordination between electricity and natural gas markets can be modeled as a Stackelberg game between a leader, i.e. the gas-aware electricity unit commitment (GAUC), and two followers, i.e. the electricity market (EM) and natural gas market (GM). This game can alleviate the reliability issues that emerged in the recent polar vortex events. In this context, the leader coordination variables represent the commitment of Gas-Fired Power Plants (GFPPs), which impacts their participation in both EM and GM. The relevant follower coordination variables represent natural gas prices in the GM. These prices impact the GAUC decisions through coordination constraints representing the profitability of the bids of GFPPs. Privacy Goal: The paper focuses on situations where the follower inputs D F S contain sensitive information that should not be revealed. In the case of electricity and natural gas markets, a FERC directive allows the gas and electricity operators to share network data, while the bids of the generators are public information. Therefore, the sensitive parameters typically represent the gas demand profile of consumers. As discussed in the introduction, if released, they can provide a competitive advantage to strategic agents in the energy system and may result in financial losses for the follower, as shown in [Zugno et al., 2013; Baringo and Conejo, 2013] . Thus, the privacy goal is to ensure that the sensitive information D F S is not breached during the coordination process described in Problem (1). The next section introduces a formal notion that will be used to achieve this goal.
Background: Differential Privacy
Differential privacy [Dwork et al., 2006] (DP) is a rigorous privacy notion used to protect disclosures of an individual's data in a computation. The paper considers datasets D F S " pd 1 , . . . , d n q with each d i P R`describing a sensitive quantity, such as the participants' demand value in the GM. DP relies on the notion of dataset adjacency, which captures the differential information to be protected. To protect the values in the dataset, the paper uses the following adjacency relation:
where D and D 1 are two datasets and α is a positive real value. Such definition is useful to hide individual participation up to some quantity α [Chatzikokolakis et al., 2013]. In the paper context, it allows customers to reveal gas demand profiles that hide the real consumption by a factor of α.
A randomized mechanism M : D Ñ R with domain D and range R is -DP if, for any output response O Ď R and any two adjacent datasets D " α D 1 , for a fixed value α ą 0: P rrMpDq P Os ď expp q P rrMpD 1 q P Os.
(
The parameter ě 0 is the privacy loss of the mechanism, with values close to 0 denoting strong privacy. The level of indistinguishability is controlled by the parameter α ą 0. The definition above was introduced by Chatzikokolakis et al. [2013] . It is a generalization of the classical DP definition, that protects individuals participation, to arbitrary metric spaces. W.l.o.g. the paper fixes " 1.0 and focuses in the indistinguishability parameter α. In the context of this work, Definition (2) is referred to as α-indistinguishability. An important DP property is immunity to post-processing.
Theorem1 (Post-Processing [Dwork and Roth, 2013] ) Let M be an α-indistinguishable mechanism and g be an arbitrary mapping from the set of possible outputs to an arbitrary set. Then, g˝M is α-indistinguishable.
A function Q (also called query) from a data set D P D to a result set R Ď R n can be made differentially private by injecting random noise to its output. The amount of noise depends on the sensitivity of the query, denoted by ∆ Q and defined as ∆ Q " max D"D 1 }QpDq´QpD 1 q} 1 . In other words, the sensitivity of a query is the maximum l 1 -distance between the query outputs of any two adjacent datasets D and D 1 .
The PPS Problem
The Privacy-Preserving Stackelberg (PPS) problem establishes the fundamental desiderata to be delivered by the obfuscation mechanism. It operates on the follower sensitive parameters D S F exchanged to ensure coordination between the leader and the follower in the resolution of Problem (1). The goal is to produce a privacy-preserving versionD S F that is α-indistinguishable from D S F and which ensures that O L˚« O L˚, whereÔ L˚i s the leader objective value in the Stackelberg game when D S F is replaced byD S F .
The PPSM Mechanism
The Privacy-Preserving Stackelberg Mechanism (PPSM) is described schematically in Figure 2 and consists of the following steps which will be described in detail subsequently: Once PPSM produces the privacy-preserving demandD F S , the leader can clear its market usingD F S to producex Lẘ hich is communicated to the follower for clearing its own market as depicted in Figure 1 . [2b] Eq. (4) [2a]
Coordination Variable Estimation Phase
[3a]ȳ 
Privacy Phase
In Step [1] , the follower takes as input its sensitive parameters D F S and constructs a privacy-preserving versionD F S using the Laplace mechanism [Dwork et al., 2006] .
Theorem2 (Laplace Mechanism) Let Q be a numeric query that maps datasets to R n . The Laplace mechanism that outputs QpDq`ξ, where ξ P R n is drawn from the Laplace distribution Lapp∆ Q { q n , achieves α-indistinguishability.
In the above, Lappλq n denotes the i.i.d. Laplace distribution with 0 mean and scale λ over n dimensions. As a result, the privacy-preserving parametersD F S are obtained as follows:
Importantly, the Laplace mechanism has been shown to be optimal, i.e., it minimizes the mean-squared error for identity queries w.r.t. the L1-norm [Koufogiannis et al., 2015] . While (3) ensures α-indistinguishability, the obfuscated data may not achieve strong fidelity with respect to the original problem. Crucially, in energy systems, the inputs generated by this mechanism often fail to produce a feasible solution to the problem of interest, as highlighted in Section 7. To remedy this limitation, the proposed PPSM introduces an optimization-based approach that aims at producing a new privacy-preserving datasetD F S establishing fidelity with respect to the constraints and objectives of the leader and follower problems.
Estimating the Coordination Variables
After having received the Laplace-obfuscated dataD F S from the follower, the leader uses model M L pD L , D F P ,D F S q to estimate the value of the coordination variables y F of the follower (Step [2a] ). Next, in Step [2b] , the leader solves the optimization problem
Problem (4) describes, in fact, the leader subproblem (Equations (1a) and (1b)), in which the values of variables y F have been fixed to the estimatesȳ F .
The leader then communicates the estimatesx L to the follower. In turn, the follower uses model M F px L , D F P ,D F S q to estimate the values of its subproblem objective valueŌ Få nd dual variablesȳ F˚ ( Step [3a] ).
Fidelity Phase
Finally, given the obfuscated parametersD F S , computed in Step [1], the estimated valuesx L , computed in Step [2b] , and the follower objective valueŌ F˚a nd dual variablesȳ F˚, computed in Step [3a] , the follower executes the following bilevel optimization problem:
where η p and η d are parameters specifying the desired fidelity for the value of the objective and dual variables of the follower. Its objective is to find new valuesD F S that minimize the distance to the Laplace-obfuscatedD F S (5a), while ensuring (component-wise) fidelity with respect to the estimated objective valueŌ F˚( 5b) and dual variablesȳ F˚( 5c). The follower objective functionÔ F and dual variablesŷ F are defined as the solutions to the lower-level problem (5d), which represents the follower subproblem P F px L , D F P ,D F S q with the new sensitive parametersD F S and the values of the coordination variables x L fixed to the estimatesx L . Additionally, this lower-level problem (5d) enforces feasibility of the follower problem with respect to the estimatesx L .
Using the equivalent Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of the linear lower-level problem (5d) and the Fortuny-Amat linearization, this bilevel problem can be recast as a mixed-integer second-order cone program (MIS-OCP) [Gabriel et al., 2012] . Theorem3 For given positive real α, PPSM satisfies αindistinguishability. Proof. The privacy phase of PPSM (Step [1] ) produces a gas demand profileD F S using the Laplace mechanism with parameter λ " α (Equation (3)). By Theorem 2, the resulting demand profile satisfies α-indistinguishability. Notice that Steps [2a]-[3b] take as input the privacy-preserving gas pro-filesD F S generated during the privacy phase, and uses exclusively the public information-e.g., the problem model and the historical data. Therefore, by the post-processing immunity property of differential privacy (Theorem 1) the output D F S of the fidelity phase satisfies α-indistinguishability. l
Error Analysis
This section analyzes the impact of the data perturbation induced by PPSM on the optimal objective value of both agents in the privacy-preserving problem. The results below hold under the assumption that the estimated valuesx L ,Ō F˚, and y F˚a re accurate. Theorem4 (Error) After the fidelity phase, the expected error induced by PPSM on the original, sensitive, parameters D F S is bounded by the inequality:
whereD FS is the solution to Problem (5).
Proof. Denote withD F S " D F S`L appαq the privacypreserving version of the gas demand profile obtained by the Laplace mechanism. We have that:
The first inequality follows from the triangle inequality on norms. The second inequality follows from:
S } 2 by optimality of xD FS ,x˚y and the fact that xD F S , x˚y is a feasible solution to constraints (5b) to (5d) (Problem 5), or, similarly, by optimality of xD Fs ,x˚,ŷ˚y and the fact that xD F S , x˚, y˚y is a feasible solution to constraints (5b) to (5d) (Problem 5). The third inequality follows directly from the variance of the Laplace distribution.
l The next theorem bounds the difference in objective value for the leader problem when the leader problem is convex and the coordination constraints are linear. Theorem5 (Cost of privacy) Consider a convex leader problem whose coordination constraints (6c) are linear;
After the fidelity phase, the error induced by PPSM on the objective valueÔ L˚o f the leader problem (6) is bounded by the inequality:
where y L˚d enotes the dual variables values associated with the constraints (6c) of the original leader problem P L pD L , D F P , D F S q. Proof. Equation (5c) enforces fidelity w.r.t. the dual coordination variables valuesȳ F˚, as estimated in step [3a] . Therefore, the upper-and lower-level variables of the DP leader problem (6), denoted P L pD L , D F P , hatD F S q, can be defined as the perturbed variables: y F "ȳ F˚`η d and x L " x L˚`δ x L ; where, x L˚a re the solutions to the leader problem P L pD L , D F P , D F S q with original sensitive parameters D F S , and the variables P U such that U Ă R J " tr 1 , . . . , J s |´1 ď j ď 1, @j P t1, . . . , Juu (J is the dimensionality of the dual variables y F )).
As a result, with a change of variables in Problem (6), the difference between the objective valueÔ L˚o f the DP leader problem P L pD L , D F P ,D F S q and the objective value O L˚o f the original leader problem P L pD L , D F P , D F S q can be expressed as the optimal objective value of the following perturbed leader problem:
In this perturbed problem, the coordination constraints (6c), are perturbed by the term η d . We define the following function f : P U Þ Ñ f p q P R, as the optimal objective value of the following (parametric) optimization problem:
The bounds of this function over the set P U will provide bounds to the objective value of the perturbed Problem (8). For any P U, f p q is upper-bounded by the optimal objective value of the following problem:
Note that, represents a worst-case scenario of the perturbed coordination constraints (6c). The solutions to the inner minimization in equation (6) iś ř J j"1 |B ij |η d . Therefore, in the worst-case leader problem (10), the right-hand side of each coordination constraint (9) is perturbed by this small amount´ř J j"1 |B ij |η d . The impact of this small perturbation on the leader objective value is ř ij |B ij y Li |η d , where y Li is the optimal dual variable associated with each coordination constraint of the leader problem with the coordination variables y F fixed to the valuesȳ F˚. If the estimatesȳ F˚a re accurate, this also represents the dual variables of the leader problem P L pD L , D F P , D F S q with the original sensitive data D F S . By analogy, we can straightforwardly deduce that a lowerbound to f p q is given by´ř ij |B ij y Li |η d . Therefore, |f p q| (and the cost of privacy) are bounded as follows:ˇˇθ
l While fidelity with respect to the follower objective value is explicitly enforced by Constraint (5b), the result above ensures fidelity with respect to the leader objective value. This fidelity is implicitly enforced by Constraint (5c) on the follower coordination variables y F , and their impact on the leader objective value via the coordination constraints (6c). This sub-optimality in the leader cost represents the so-called cost of privacy.
Experimental Evaluation
The performance of the proposed PPSM is illustrated on the motivation problem introduced in Section 2. The leader represents the GAUC problem, and the two followers represent the EM and GM problems. The PPSM aims at preserving privacy on the sensitive gas demand profiles (D g S ) in the GM, and fidelity with respect to the original Stackelberg game. Fidelity constraints are explicitly enforced on the original objective value of the GM pO g˚q and gas prices py g˚q . Additionally, the implicit impact of the PPSM on the original objective values of the GAUC (O uc˚) and the EM (O e˚) is analyzed.
Case study setup. The PPSM is evaluated on a test system that represents the joint natural gas and electricity systems in the Northeastern US [Byeon and Van Hentenryck, 2019] . The system is composed of the IEEE 36-bus power system [Allen et al., 2008] and a gas transmission network covering the Pennsylvania-to-northeast New England area. An indepth description of the GAUC problem and case-study setup will be provided upon request.
This case study analyzes the performance of PPSM under various operating conditions of the gas and electricity systems. The electricity demand profile is uniformly increased by a stress factor ranging from 30% to 60%, and the gas demand profile is increased by a stress factor ranging from 10% to 130%, producing increasingly stressed and difficult operating conditions. The experiments compare the proposed PPSM to a version (PPSM p ) that omits the fidelity constraint on the dual variables (5c). Both versions are compared with the standard Laplace mechanism for varying values of the privacy parameter α P t0.1, 1, 10uˆ10 2 MWh, and the fidelity parameters η p " η d P t0.01, 0.1, 10.0u% of the original objective value of the GM pO g˚q and gas prices py g˚q , respectively. In the GAUC problem, the original, sensitive, gas demand vector is denoted D g S (in lieu of D F S ). Notice that, in the highest stress factor adopted, this demand vector has minimum, median, and maximum values: 0, 3.38ˆ10 2 , 98.31ˆ10 2 , respectively. Therefore, the privacy parameters adopted ensure a very low privacy risk.
To induce uncertainty on the gas cost estimatesȳ g (in lieu ofȳ F ), the experiments use a noisy version resulted by perturbing the original estimates y g˚u sing Normal noise with standard deviation equal to 10% of the average value of y g˚. The experiments also evaluated benchmarks that use precise cost estimates. The results trends are consistent with those provided here.
We generate 30 repetitions for each test case and report average results in all experiments and impose a 1-hour wallclock limit. A wall-clock limit of 1 hour is given to generate and solve each of the instances. The resolution of the privacypreserving demand profiles (phases [1] and [2] of PPSM) takes less than 30s for any of the instances. ) for varying indistinguishability parameters α, and ηp " η d " 0.1% of the leaders objective value and the dual variables values, respectively. Right: Errors (%) on the leader objective (∆Ouc ) and followers' objectives (∆Oe and ∆Og ).
Limits of The Laplace Mechanism
This section studies the applicability of the Laplace mechanism to our context of interest. Table 1 (left) reports the percentage of the feasible solutions (over 1260 instances) across different values of the privacy parameter α. It compares the Laplace mechanism with PPSM p and PPSM. When α ą 0.1 the Laplace-obfuscated gas demands rarely produce a feasible solution to the GAUC problem. These results justify the need for more advanced privacy-preserving mechanisms for Stackelberg games, and hence the proposed PPSM. In contrast, the PPSMs result in a much higher number of feasible solutions. Indeed, all "unsolved" PPSM cases are due to timeout and not as a direct result of infeasibility. Additionally, we verified that the two PPSMs are always able to find a feasible solution to the GM follower problem with the gas demand profileD g S . Table 1 (left) also reports the L1 distance ∆ d between the original gas demand D g S and the privacy-preserving versions obtained with each of the mechanisms analyzed. Unsurprisingly, the L1 errors increase with the increasing of parameter α, as larger values of α induce more noise. However, the L1 errors introduced by the PPSM are much more contained than the Laplace ones, producing more than an order of magnitude more accurate results for the larger privacy parameters. These results indicate that the highly-perturbed demand profiles induced by the Laplace mechanism lead to infeasibility in the GAUC problem, whereas both PPSM and PPSM p manage to restore feasibility of the post-processed demand profiles.
Leader and Follower Objectives
The next results evaluate the ability of PPSM to preserve the optimal objective values of the leader and the follower problems. u and are computed in expectation over the feasible instances only. Parameter α controls the amount of noise being added to the gas demand profiles, therefore, the objective costs are closer to their original values when α is small. Observe that the PPSMs induce objective costs differences that are from one to two orders of magnitude more accurate than those induced by the Laplace mechanism, and that are at most 0.4% of the original objec- tive costs. Additionally, PPSM is consistently more accurate than PPSM p ; By enforcing fidelity of the coordination variables y g , PPSM better limits the impact of the noise on the leader objective (GAUC), which in turn results in more faithful solutions for the followers' problems. These results are further illustrated in Table 2 , that analyzes the difference in objective costs at varying fidelity parameters η p and η d , for a fixed privacy parameter α " 10 (i.e., the largest privacy level attainable in our experimental setting). Once again, the results of the PPSM mechanisms are at least two orders of magnitude more precise than those obtained by the Laplace mechanism. Additionally, notice that the fidelity parameters η p and η d impact the accuracy of the privacypreserving objective costs. Indeed, they indirectly control the deviation of the privacy-preserving GAUC and GM objectives with respect to the original counterparts. While the results differences are small, in percentage, their impact on the objective functions (in the 10 6 order) is non-negligible.
Stress Levels Analysis
Finally, this subsection details the effect of the privacypreserving mechanisms on the combined GAUC problem for all the electricity and gas stress levels adopted. Figure 3 reports heatmaps of the total (GAUC) objective cost difference, in percentage, at varying electricity (e) and gas (g) stress levels for the privacy-preserving data obtained via the Laplace mechanism (top), PPSM p (middle), and PPSM (bottom). Each square represents the objective cost difference averaged over 30 instances for a particular electricity and gas stress level. The darker the color, the more pronounced are the errors committed by the mechanisms, as reported in the legends on top of each subfigure. Gray squares represent the set of instances for which no feasible solution of the GAUC problem was found or when a timeout is reached. The illustration reports the cost differences for privacy parameters α " 0.1 (left) α " 1.0 (middle), and α " 10.0 (right).
These results illustrate three trends: Firstly, for every mechanism, the objective differences become more pronounced as the electricity and gas stress levels increase. This can be explained by the increased impact of the Laplace perturbations on higher values of gas demand profiles. Secondly, they remark that the PPSMs produce privacy-preserving Stackelberg problems that are consistently more faithful to the original problems with respect to those produced by the Laplace mechanism. Finally, they show that PPSM is consistently more accurate than PPSM p across all stress levels. These results are significant, as they show the robustness of the proposed PPSMs over different electricity and natural gas demand profiles. They indicate that PPSM can provide a realistic and efficient solution for the coordination of electricity and natural gas markets.
Related Work
The obfuscation of data values under the lens of differential privacy is a challenging task that has been studied from several angles. Often, the released data is generated from a data synopsis in the form of a noisy histogram Hay et al., 2016; Qardaji et al., 2014; Mohammed et al., 2011; Xiao et al., 2010] . These methods are typically adopted in the context of statistical queries. The design of markets for private data has also received considerable attention, see for instance [Ghosh and Roth, 2010; Niu et al., 2018] .
However, all the proposals above, do not involve data used as input to a complex optimization problem, as in the case of this work. The closest work related to the proposal in this paper can be considered [Fioretto and Van Hentenryck, 2018; Fioretto et al., 2019a] , which, in the context energy networks, propose a privacy-preserving mechanism for releasing datasets that can be used as input to an optimal power flow problem. A similar line of work uses hierarchical (bilevel) optimization for obfuscating the energy network parameters or locations while ensuring high utility for the problem of interest [Fioretto et al., 2019a; Fioretto et al., 2019b] .
In contrast to these studies, the proposed PPSM focuses on solving Stackelberg games in which the follower parameters are sensitive. PPSM also enforces the notion of fidelity of the privacy-preserving information with respect to the leader and follower objectives. Finally, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first DP mechanism that is applied to the coordination of sequential electricity and natural gas markets.
Conclusions
This paper introduced a differentially private (DP) mechanism to protect the sensitive information exchanged during the coordination of the sequential electricity and natural gas market clearings. The proposed Privacy-Preserving Stackelberg Mechanism (PPSM) obfuscates the gas demand profile exchanged by the gas market, while also ensuring that the resulting problem preserves the fundamental properties of the original Stackelberg game. The PPSM was shown to enjoy strong properties: It complies with the notion of DP and ensures that the outcomes of the privacy-preserving Stackelberg mechanism are close-to-optimality for each agent. Experimental results on several gas and electricity market benchmarks based on a real case study demonstrated the effectiveness of the approach: The PPSM was shown to obtain up to two orders of magnitude improvement on the cost of the agents when compared to a traditional Laplace mechanism.
Future work will focus on several avenues, including extended theoretical bounds on the cost of privacy, studying the game-theoretic properties of this privacy-preserving Stackelberg game, accounting for uncertainty on the public data, and, studying the applicability of the PPSM to other domains.
